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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1987, the California Legislature enacted a very confusing statute1 
 
*  Agnes Roddy Robb Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley (Boalt 
Hall). 
1. As enacted in 1987, California Civil Code section 1714.45 provided:  
 (a) In a product liability action, a manufacturer or seller shall not be liable if: 
(1) The product is inherently unsafe and the product is known to be unsafe 
by the ordinary consumer who consumes the product with the ordinary 
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that some have read to give tobacco companies rather sweeping 
“immunity” from tort litigation.2  Ten years later the California 
Legislature reversed itself, overturning a portion of the prior statute, by 
adding new provisions that also contain confusing language.3  At a 
 
knowledge common to the community; and 
 (2)  The product is a common consumer product intended for personal 
consumption, such as sugar, castor oil, alcohol, tobacco, and butter, as 
identified in comment i to Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts. 
(b) For purposes of this section, the term “product liability action” 
means any action for injury or death caused by a product, except that the 
term does not include an action based on a manufacturing defect or breach 
of an express warranty. 
(c) This section is intended to be declarative of and does not alter or 
amend existing California law, including Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 
(1972) 8 Cal. 3d 121, and shall apply to all product liability actions 
pending on, or commenced after, January 1, 1988. 
Willie L. Brown Jr.-Bill Lockyer Civil Liability Reform Act of 1987, ch. 1498, § 3, 1987 
Cal. Stat. 5777, 5778–79 (current version at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.45 (Deering Supp. 
2000)). 
 2. Martin R. Glick & H. Joseph Escher III, Personal Choice and Civil Code 
Section 1714.45: An Epilogue for California’s Smoking and Health Litigation, 25 CAL. 
W. L. REV. 239, 239 (1989); see Paul Glastris, Frank Fat’s Napkin: How the Trial 
Lawyers (and the Doctors!) Sold Out to the Tobacco Companies, WASH. MONTHLY, Dec. 
1987, at 19.  Glick and Escher were and Escher remains counsel to R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Company.  See also Darren O’Leary Aitken, Note, The Product Liability 
Provision of the Civil Liability Reform Act of 1987: An Evaluation of Its Impact and 
Scope, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1449, 1457 (1989). 
  3. In 1997 the statute was amended to provide: 
  (a) In a product liability action, a manufacturer or seller shall not be 
liable if both of the following apply: 
(1) The product is inherently unsafe and the product is known to be 
unsafe by the ordinary consumer who consumes the product with the 
ordinary knowledge common to the community. 
(2) The product is a common consumer product intended for personal 
consumption, such as sugar, castor oil, alcohol, and butter, as identified in 
comment i to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 
 (b) This section does not exempt the manufacture or sale of tobacco 
products by tobacco manufacturers and their successors in interest from 
product liability actions, but does exempt the sale or distribution of tobacco 
products by any other person, including, but not limited to, retailers or 
distributors. 
 (c) For purposes of this section, the term “product liability action” 
means any action for injury or death caused by a product, except that the 
term does not include an action based on a manufacturing defect or breach 
of an express warranty. 
 (d) This section is intended to be declarative of and does not alter or 
amend existing California law, including Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 
(1972) 8 Cal. 3d 121, and shall apply to all product liability actions 
pending on, or commenced after, January 1, 1988. 
 (e) This section does not apply to, and never applied to, an action 
brought by a public entity to recover the value of benefits provided to 
individuals injured by a tobacco-related illness caused by the tortious 
conduct of a tobacco company or its successor in interest, including, but 
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minimum, the 1997 changes eliminate any immunity that the prior law 
might have created (at least for the future). 
The California Supreme Court has now taken a case that concerns the 
interpretation of these two pieces of legislation.4  A major focus of the 
tobacco companies and the claimants is on whether the 1997 amendment 
is only prospective in its effect, a conclusion reached by the Court of 
Appeal.5  However, the case also raises a second important issue 
concerning what sorts of claims the old law actually barred. 
Quite apart from the retroactivity issue, the plaintiffs’ lawyers argued 
that at least some of their clients’ claims against the tobacco company 
defendants (for example, claims based on fraud and misrepresentation) 
were valid even during the decade when the old law was in effect.  
Hence, whatever immunity that old law might have provided, it did not 
preclude these types of claims.  Plaintiffs’ conclusion is supported in this 
Article, but for reasons that are quite different from the arguments they 
 
not limited to, an action brought pursuant to Section 14124.71 of the 
Welfare and Institutions Code.  In such an action brought by a public 
entity, the fact that the injured individual’s claim against the defendant may 
be barred by a prior version of this section shall not be a defense. This 
subdivision does not constitute a change in, but is declaratory of, existing 
law relating to tobacco products. 
(f) It is the intention of the Legislature in enacting the amendments to 
subdivisions (a) and (b) of this section adopted at the 1997–98 Regular 
Session to declare that there exists no statutory bar to tobacco-related 
personal injury, wrongful death, or other tort claims against tobacco 
manufacturers and their successors in interest by California smokers or 
others who have suffered or incurred injuries, damages, or costs arising 
from the promotion, marketing, sale, or consumption of tobacco products. 
It is also the intention of the Legislature to clarify that such claims which 
were or are brought shall be determined on their merits, without the 
imposition of any claim of statutory bar or categorical defense. 
(g) This section shall not be construed to grant immunity to a tobacco 
industry research organization. 
Act of Sept. 29, 1997, ch. 570, sec. 1, § 1714.45, 1997 Cal. Chapters 1, 1–2 (codified as 
amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.45 (1997)) (amended 1998).  Section 1714.45 was 
amended again in 1998, but the changes were not substantive.  Act of Sept. 14, 1998, ch. 
485, sec. 38 § 1714.45, 1998 Cal. Chapters 1, 34–35 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 1714.45 (1998)).  For discussions of the 1997 amendment, see Rodney R. Moy, 
Tobacco Companies, Immune No More—California’s Removal of the Legal Barriers 
Preventing Plaintiffs from Recovering for Tobacco-Related Illness, 29 MCGEORGE L. 
REV. 761 (1998); Benjamin C. Graves, Note, Richards v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.: The 
Pyrrhic Victory of Proposition 51 and the Death of Fault Immunity for Tobacco, 33 
U.S.F. L. REV. 459 (1999). 
 4. Naegele v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 11 P.3d 953 (Cal. 2000). 
 5. Naegele v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 666, 677–78 (2000). 
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have advanced in the case.  The Court of Appeal summarily dealt with 
this issue in favor of the defendants.6 
It is argued here that the 1987 statute should be read only to bar claims 
that are based upon legal theories at odds with comment i to section 
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.7  As of 1987, no California 
case had rejected comment i.  However, developments in New Jersey, 
arguments in the scholarly literature, and dicta in a key opinion of the 
California Supreme Court (all discussed below) created a concern 
among potential defendants that the California Supreme Court might be 
headed towards rejecting comment i, and that such a step could mean 
imposing sweeping product liability on makers of inherently unsafe 
products like cigarettes.  Hence, the 1987 statute, which itself 
specifically refers to comment i, should be understood as a legislative 
decision to head off the possibility that the common law would evolve in 
that way.  This interpretation of the 1987 statute not only makes 
 
 6. Id. at 678. 
  7. Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 402A, provides: 
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous 
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical 
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without 
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. 
  (2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale 
of his product, and 
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into 
any contractual relation with the seller. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).  Comment i provides: 
 i. Unreasonably dangerous.  The rule stated in this Section applies only 
where the defective condition of the product makes it unreasonably dangerous 
to the user or consumer.  Many products cannot possibly be made entirely safe 
for all consumption, and any food or drug necessarily involves some risk of 
harm, if only from over-consumption.  Ordinary sugar is a deadly poison to 
diabetics, and castor oil found use under Mussolini as an instrument of torture. 
That is not what is meant by “unreasonably dangerous” in this Section.  The 
article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be 
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary 
knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.  Good whiskey 
is not unreasonably dangerous merely because it will make some people drunk, 
and is especially dangerous to alcoholics; but bad whiskey, containing a 
dangerous amount of fusel oil, is unreasonably dangerous.  Good tobacco is 
not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may be 
harmful; but tobacco containing something like marijuana may be 
unreasonably dangerous.  Good butter is not unreasonably dangerous merely 
because, if such be the case, it deposits cholesterol in the arteries and leads to 
heart attacks; but bad butter, contaminated with poisonous fish oil, is 
unreasonably dangerous. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965). 
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reasonable sense of its confusing language, but also reflects the state of 
thinking about tobacco tort claims at the time it was enacted. 
Under this interpretation, the plaintiffs’ legal claims in Naegele that 
are based on fraud, conspiracy, and perhaps on other theories, should not 
be barred by the 1987 statute because such claims are not precluded by 
comment i.  Whether plaintiffs can actually prove all the necessary 
elements of these permissible claims is quite another matter.  But 
according to this interpretation of the 1987 statute, plaintiffs should at 
least be entitled to try. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Before 1963, lawsuits in California by victims of product injuries were 
either handled under principles of negligence or they were cast as 
contract claims that drew on “implied warranty” principles.8  For 
example, if someone bought a loaf of bread from a local bakery, took a 
bite out of the loaf, and it turned out that a sharp pin hidden in the bread 
injured the person, the victim could sue the bakery (1) in tort, claiming 
that the bakery negligently allowed the pin to get into the bread, or (2) in 
contract, claiming that in providing this sort of bread the bakery 
breached implied warranties of fitness and merchantability.  (More 
likely, the plaintiff’s lawyer would assert both tort and contract claims.) 
A.  Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.9 and the                       
Restatement (Second) of Torts 
Starting with the Greenman case in 1963, the California Supreme 
Court broke new ground by adopting the principle of “strict liability in 
tort” as a basis of recovery for injury caused by defectively 
manufactured products such as the bread with a pin in it.10  Negligence 
and warranty claims were essentially rendered obsolete in these settings, 
and in the above example the bakery would be liable to the victim 
regardless of fault because the bread the victim bought and that caused 
the injury was obviously “defective.”  To be more precise, the major 
doctrinal change this decision brought about on the tort side was that the 
plaintiff no longer had to prove that the bakery had failed to exercise due 
 
 8. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944) (affirming 
judgment for the plaintiff based upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur). 
 9. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). 
 10. Id. at 900. 
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care in allowing the pin to get into the bread; it sufficed that the pin was 
there when the plaintiff bought the loaf.11 
In Greenman, the California Supreme Court embraced the rule that 
Justice Roger Traynor had advocated many years earlier in his now 
famous concurring opinion in the Escola case.12  In that opinion, Traynor 
argued for strict liability in tort on a wide range of policy grounds, 
including considerations of justice, accident prevention, compensation of 
victims, and administrative simplification.13 
At the time of Greenman, Dean William Prosser of the Law School at 
University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall) was serving as the Chief 
Reporter for the American Law Institute as it worked to revise the 
Restatement of the Law of Torts, originally issued in the 1930s.14  
Prosser seized on his former faculty colleague Traynor’s views, just then 
adopted in Greenman, and convinced the American Law Institute to 
endorse what became section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts.15  As others have recounted, it was hardly the case that the 
California position could be fairly said to “restate” the common law 
throughout America at the time.16  But owing either to Prosser’s 
prescience or a combination of his persuasiveness and the persuasiveness of 
the California Supreme Court’s opinion in Greenman, in a short period 
of time the basic principle embodied in section 402A did become the law 
nearly everywhere in the nation.17  Indeed, many jurisdictions cited 
section 402A as a reason for adopting the principle of strict liability in 
tort,18 thereby rendering it a true restatement of the law. 
 
 11. See id. at 900–01.  Under prior tort doctrine, the plaintiff almost surely could 
have invoked res ipsa loquitur in such a case, which, in effect, forced the defendant to 
show that he was not negligent in allowing the pin to get into the bread, and which, as a 
practical matter, pretty much amounted to the same thing as strict liability. 
 12. Escola, 150 P.2d at 440–44 (Traynor, J., concurring). 
 13. Id. 
 14. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (1934); G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN 
AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 155, 163 (1980); George L. Priest, The Invention 
of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort 
Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUDIES 461, 512, 517 n.358 (1985). 
 15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); Priest, supra note 14, at 
465, 513–14 (stating that after Greenman, “Prosser was back at the 1964 meetings of the 
[ALI] with a third draft—the present section 402A—that extended the strict liability 
standard to all products”). 
 16. See, e.g., Priest, supra note 14, at 513–18; Gary T. Schwartz, Foreword: 
Understanding Products Liability, 67 CAL. L. REV. 435, 435, 438 (1979). 
 17. See Priest, supra note 14, at 518. 
 18. See, e.g., Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d 182, 187, 188 (Ill. 1965) 
(citing Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A to support the court’s conclusion that 
a manufacturer of a brake system came within the rule of strict liability); Buttrick v. 
Arthur Lessard & Sons, Inc., 260 A.2d 111, 113 (N.H. 1969) (citing Restatement 
(Second) of Torts section 402A as the basis for applying a rule of strict liability in 
manufacturing defect cases); Webb v. Zern, 220 A.2d 853, 854 (Pa. 1966) (citing 
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Prosser and Traynor realized that holding defendants strictly liable for 
defectively manufactured products was the analytically easy part.  Those 
products plainly did not conform to what either the manufacturer or the 
consumer wanted.  If a carbonated beverage bottle exploded and injured 
you, or a candy bar contained an impurity that made you ill, or a 
mismade wheel fell off your car causing it to crash, the product was 
obviously defective.  But not all product injuries come about from 
products that are defective in this way.  In the years after Greenman, 
most tort scholars have adopted, as a matter of analytical convenience, 
two other main categories of defective products: products that are 
defective in design and products that are defective as to their warning.19 
These three categories of defects—manufacturing, design, and 
warning—by no means imply that there is tort liability for all product 
injuries.  To the contrary, most product-related injuries that occur are not 
the result of product defects,20 and in those cases, if the plaintiff sues, the 
defendant should win.  For example, if you fall off a well-made ladder 
and injure yourself, you probably will not be able to win a case against 
the ladder maker.  Or, if you cut yourself with a sharp knife, you 
probably will not be able to win a case against the knife maker. 
Prosser does not seem to have foreseen the full range of product injury 
cases that might occur, and he did not expressly embrace the threefold 
categorization of defects in section 402A.  But he clearly had some 
important insights into the looming question of how broadly the strict 
liability principle should sweep.  Prosser dealt with that issue in two 
ways.  First, he restricted strict liability to products with defects, and 
then he defined “defect” in a way so as to exclude cases in which he felt 
there should be no strict liability.  Specifically, section 402A applies 
strict liability to the seller of “any product in a defective condition 
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer.”21  Second, Prosser 
added comments to section 402A, as is typical in the Restatement, 
several of which describe certain types of harms that he felt were outside 
of a fair understanding of those caused by defective products.  These 
included the now famous comment i, in which Prosser specifically 
singled out tobacco products (as well as whiskey, butter, castor oil, and 
 
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A and adopting it “as the law of Pennsylvania”). 
 19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998). 
 20. Stephen D. Sugarman, A Century of Change in Personal Injury Law, 88 CAL. 
L. REV. 2403, 2419–23 (2000). 
 21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965). 




In comment i, Prosser’s analysis was that even if tobacco products 
were inherently dangerous, they were nevertheless not normally 
“unreasonably” dangerous because, he assumed, the dangers of 
cigarettes were known to the ordinary consumer and they simply could 
not be made safe.  (It is perhaps worth recalling in this respect that 
section 402A was adopted in the same year the famous Surgeon 
General’s report was issued that linked smoking to lung cancer and other 
diseases.)23  Put differently, as Prosser saw it, “unreasonably” dangerous 
products are either products that are more dangerous than expected or 
products that can be made safer.  And those, and only those, are products 
to which liability should attach regardless of fault. 
Notice how, without specifically saying so, Prosser’s understanding 
broadly covers the three categories of defects that legal analysts 
generally talk about today: design defects occur when products can be 
made safer, and products are generally more dangerous than expected 
when there is either a manufacturing or warning defect.  Prosser also 
notes in passing that if a specific tobacco product were secretly laced 
with dangerous impurities, it would be a defective product (what we now 
call a manufacturing defect).  His example, which may seem quaint now, 
was tobacco that contained marijuana.24 
Although section 402A was viewed from the outset as capturing (or 
creating) a very important expansion in tort law, in the scholarly 
literature of the 1960s and 1970s some writers were advocating an even 
more sweeping approach to strict liability in tort—one that went well 
beyond what Traynor and Prosser had initially imagined.  Perhaps the 
broadest view holds that all of the accident costs associated with a 
product should be internalized into the cost of that product, whether or 
not the product was “defective” as that notion was understood under the 
Restatement’s definition.25  For example, well-known but unavoidable 
side effects of valuable pharmaceutical drugs would be considered as 
 
 22. Id. § 402A cmt. i.  
 23. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH: 
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH 
SERVICE (1964). 
 24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i.  Perhaps Prosser was moved 
to give that example as he witnessed life in Berkeley in the 1960s. 
 25. For some flavor of this “enterprise liability” approach and recent attempts to 
reinvigorate it, see generally, VIRGINIA E. NOLAN & EDMUND URSIN, UNDERSTANDING 
ENTERPRISE LIABILITY: RETHINKING TORT REFORM FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
(1995); Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case 
for Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683 (1993); Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund 
Ursin, The Deacademification of Tort Theory, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 59 (1999); Robert L. 
Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Ideology of Enterprise Liability, 55 MD. L. REV. 1190 
(1996). 
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part of the costs of those drugs, to be internalized in their price through 
the tort system.  Under this view of sweeping strict liability, tort law 
would force all buyers to pay more for their drugs, but the unlucky ones 
who suffered the side effects would be compensated for their losses via 
the tort system.  Using strict liability as a way to provide compensation 
for victims was certainly one of the policy goals Traynor pointed to in 
his early advocacy of strict liability for what we now call manufacturing 
defects. 
The cost internalization approach would move the difficult products 
liability analysis up to a different level.  That is, if the Restatement’s 
definition of defect were abandoned, exactly which accident costs should 
be properly understood to be associated with which product?  For 
example, suppose someone is hurt falling off a ladder onto the patio 
while cleaning the gutters.  Is this a cost to be associated with gutters?  
With ladders?  With patios?  With the nursery that sold the victim the 
trees whose leaves were in the gutters?  Guido Calabresi, then a law 
professor and now a federal appellate court judge, attacked this issue 
with gusto in many brilliant pieces over several years.26  He argued that 
accident costs should be assigned to what he termed the “cheapest . . . 
cost avoider.”27   
In the end, this sort of sweeping approach to strict liability has never 
really caught on in the courts.  Indeed, as to the example given above of 
known, but unavoidable, side effects of a pharmaceutical drug, courts 
around the country have by now largely agreed that if an adequate 
warning has been provided, the product is not defective.28  Prosser 
himself favored this result, as comment k to section 402A makes clear.29 
Nevertheless, back in the 1970s and 1980s, it seemed quite possible 
that the California Supreme Court would embrace a substantially wider 
role for strict liability in tort than the Restatement contemplated.  For 
one thing, on several occasions, and most forcefully in Cronin v. J.B.E. 
 
 26. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of 
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An 
Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1965); Guido 
Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 
1055 (1972). 
 27. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
135 (1970). 
 28. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(b)(3), (d) (1997). 
 29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k. 
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Olson Corp. in 1972,30 the California Supreme Court made clear that, in 
contrast to the Restatement, “unreasonably dangerous” was not part of 
the test of product liability in California.31  Rather, it was held sufficient 
to show that the product is “defective.”32  To the California Supreme 
Court, Prosser’s definition of defect in section 402A sounded too much 
like negligence.33  That is, the Restatement’s phrase “defective condition 
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer”34 sounded too much 
like the negligence law that strict liability was intended to replace.  After 
all, negligence itself is about dangers that are unreasonably created 
because they should have been avoided. 
Just what defective would mean in California, however, was not 
determined in Cronin.  Because the actual cases coming before the 
California Supreme Court through the Cronin case seemed to be either 
cases of manufacturing defects or cases of negligent designs, the 
ultimate scope of California law was left unresolved.  Greenman, for 
example, seemed to involve a poorly designed shop tool.35  Cronin 
seemed to involve a hasp on a delivery truck that was either poorly 
designed or defectively manufactured.36 
B.  Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.37 and the Possibilities of        
Footnote 10 
In 1978 the California Supreme Court decided the Barker case, in 
which the plaintiff was injured when a high-lift loader he was operating 
overturned.38  The plaintiff’s claim, in effect, was that the loader was 
defectively designed.39  The trial court had charged the jury using the 
Restatement’s definition of defect, but the California Supreme Court 
rejected that instruction, reaffirming Cronin’s holding that the 
“unreasonably dangerous” language of the Restatement was not the law 
in California.40 
What then would constitute a defective design?  The California 
Supreme Court answered that there were two bases on which that might 
be determined.  First, the product might be found to have “failed to 
 
 30. 501 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1972). 
 31. Id. at 1155, 1163. 
 32. Id. at 1162–63. 
 33. Id. at 1161–62. 
 34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1). 
 35. 377 P.2d 897, 898 (Cal. 1963). 
 36. 501 P.2d at 1155–56. 
 37. 573 P.2d 443 (1978). 
 38. Id. at 447. 
 39. Id. at 445–46. 
 40. Id. at 446. 
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perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect”41 (known now 
as the “consumer expectations” prong of Barker).  Or, second, the 
product’s design could be found to embody an “excessive preventable 
danger,” as a case in which “the risk of the danger inherent in the 
challenged design outweighs the benefits of such design”42 (known now 
as the “risk-benefit” prong of Barker). 
The California Supreme Court apparently thought that this risk-benefit 
test itself sounded rather like the negligence concept it had rejected in 
Cronin.  Hence, two additional features were added to the test: (1) it 
would be applied by the jury “through hindsight,” and (2) once the 
plaintiff makes a prima facie showing, the burden would shift to the 
defendant to prove that the product passes the risk-benefit test.43 
By itself, Barker’s holding on the law of strict liability in California 
should not have been threatening to cigarette makers.  In setting out the 
risk-benefit prong, the California Supreme Court emphasized that the 
key question under that test was a comparison between the actual design 
and a proposed safer alternative.44  And, at that point, no one was 
suggesting a safer cigarette was possible.  Under the consumer 
expectations prong, tobacco companies were reasonably content to rest 
on the argument that smokers knew what they were getting into when 
they decided to smoke.  This is often deemed the “assumption of risk” 
defense.45  In addition, the defendants could assert “no causation” in 
response to inadequate warning claims; that is, the defendants could 
argue that the plaintiff could not show that any other warning would 
have made any difference in the plaintiff’s smoking behavior. 
However, and highly significant for purposes of the case now before 
the California Supreme Court, in footnote 10 of Barker, Acting Chief 
Justice Tobriner stated for the California Supreme Court: “[W]e have no 
occasion to determine whether a product which entails a substantial risk 
of harm may be found defective even if no safer alternative design is 
feasible.”46  Justice Tobriner then went out of his way to quote from an 
 
 41. Id. at 454. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 454–55. 
 44. Id. at 455. 
 45. This idea is better understood simply to be a claim that the product was not 
defective because the plaintiff could not show that its warning was inadequate.  Stephen 
D. Sugarman, Assumption of Risk, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 833, 857–59 (1997). 
 46. Barker, 573 P.2d at 455 n.10. 
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earlier opinion of the California Supreme Court47 that, in passing, cited a 
law review article written by Justice Traynor subsequent to the 
Greenman decision,48 in which Justice Traynor suggested that “liability 
might be imposed as to products whose norm is danger.”49 
At least two new and expanded notions of strict products liability lurk 
in footnote 10, both of which could be extremely threatening to tobacco 
companies.  One is that the California Supreme Court would allow the 
risk-benefit test to be applied to the product itself, with the alternative 
being no product at all (rather than a safer design).  Here looms the 
possibility that a jury could decide that, as a social matter, the risks of 
smoking outweigh the benefits, and therefore cigarettes are “defective” 
products.  In effect, a jury might conclude that manufacturers have no 
more business selling cigarettes than they have selling shop tools that 
could be more safely designed. 
Indeed, the New Jersey Supreme Court took a step down this very 
road five years after Barker in O’Brien v. Muskin.50  There, the plaintiff 
dove into a three and one-half feet deep, vinyl-lined, above-ground 
swimming pool, struck his head on the bottom, and sustained serious 
injuries.51  The New Jersey Supreme Court sent the case back for retrial 
on the central ground that the trial court should have allowed the jury to 
find that the “risk posed by the pool outweighed its utility” even if “there 
are no alternative methods” of making the pool safer.52 
A second possibility raised by footnote 10 in Barker is that strict 
liability should attach to very dangerous products, whether or not they 
fail the risk-benefit test.  Simply put, the argument would be, not that all 
accident costs should be internalized into all products that cause them, 
but rather that accident costs should be internalized into highly 
dangerous products.  This approach might avoid the dilemma raised by 
the earlier example of someone falling off a ladder while cleaning the 
gutters.53 
Because this latter approach would essentially discard the “defect” 
requirement, it would, in turn, raise a new difficulty.  Precisely what 
would make a product sufficiently dangerous to trigger this form of strict 
liability?  One possibility is to seek help from the law of “abnormally 
 
 47. Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 482 P.2d 681 (Cal. 1971). 
 48. Roger J. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict 
Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363 (1965). 
 49. Jiminez, 482 P.2d at 684; Traynor, supra note 48, at 368. 
 50. O’Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983). 
 51. Id. at 302. 
 52. Id. at 306.  The New Jersey court, in a different context, had already embraced 
true strict liability beyond the manufacturing defect setting in its 1982 decision in 
Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 549 (N.J. 1982). 
 53. See supra Part II.A. 
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dangerous activities,” covered by sections 519 and 520 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, since that is the area of tort law in which strict 
liability is imposed on uncommon activities that are highly dangerous.54 
Alternatively, courts might simply have to be content with a 
traditional common law evolution of a doctrine of strict liability for 
highly dangerous products on a case-by-case basis.  Indeed, perhaps 
such a doctrine would prove to be unstable at the margins (as a similar 
rule about “things imminently dangerous to life” proved difficult to 
apply in a coherent manner in the early law governing manufacturer 
liability for negligently made products before it was swept away in 
Judge Cardozo’s famous MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. decision in 
1916).55  For tobacco companies, however, concerns about the details 
and borders of a potential rule of strict liability for highly dangerous 
products were beside the point.  If any product was going to attract strict 
liability because its “norm is danger,”56 it would be hard to imagine a 
more promising candidate than cigarettes. 
In short, under either of these possible extensions of product liability 
law, comment i to section 402A would be rejected. 
As it turns out, in the more than two decades since Barker, the 
California Supreme Court has not followed up on Justice Tobriner’s 
intimations in footnote 10.  In the same vein, the new Restatement 
(Third) of Torts asserts (albeit over the vigorous dissent of some 
members57) that warning and design defect cases really are negligence 
cases—the product is only defective if, at the time it was put into the 
market, it could have been more safely designed or could have carried a 
more adequate warning.58  To be sure, in some of the California 
 
 54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519–20 (1977). 
 55. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1051–52 (N.Y. 1916) (citing 
Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852), and discussing the problematic earlier rule 
developed in sources cited). 
 56. See sources cited supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 57. See, e.g., Rebecca Korzec, Dashing Consumer Hopes: Strict Products Liability 
and the Demise of the Consumer Expectations Test, 20 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 227 
(1997); Howard A. Latin, The Preliminary Draft of a Proposed Restatement (Third) of 
Torts: Products Liability—Letter 15 J. PROD. & TOXICS LIABILITY 169 (1993) 
(addressing the American Law Institute); John F. Vargo, The Emperor’s New Clothes: 
The American Law Institute Adorns a “New Cloth” for Section 402A Products Liability 
Design Defects—A Survey of the States Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 
493 (1996); see also James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus 
on Defective Product Design, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 867 (1998). 
 58. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 1–2 (1977). 
SURGARMAN.DOC 3/2/2020  4:08 PM 
 
1064 
Supreme Court’s more recent opinions59 it has continued to insist that, in 
contrast to the Restatement (Third), strict product liability in California 
remains truly “strict” and is not really negligence law.  Nonetheless, the 
actual outcomes of those more recent cases make clear that the sweeping 
strict liability suggested by footnote 10 in Barker has not been adopted.60 
However, in 1987, when the statute at issue here was enacted, the 
picture was much less clear.  For example, in 1985 the California 
Supreme Court imposed strict liability on landlords (for defective 
products provided in the apartments they leased).61 
III.  THE 1987 STATUTE 
If one looks at the situation as of 1987, as it has been characterized 
here, then one can make sense of what the California Legislature seems 
to have been trying to do with section 1714.45.  Simply put, the 
Legislature was trying to enact Prosser’s comment i to section 402A as 
the law of California.  That is what subsection (a) of the statute is all 
about.  Indeed, note that subsection (a)(2) specifically mentions comment 
i, and it lists the very products that Prosser named.62  If one understands 
subsection (a) as so intended, one can then make sense of subsections (b) 
and (c) as well. 
Subsection (b) makes clear that the statute does not preclude 
manufacturing defect or express warranty claims,63 which, of course, 
comment i also never intended to prevent.  Comment i, as explained at 
length above,64 meant to preclude plaintiffs from succeeding with what 
we now know as design or warning defect claims where there was no 
safer alternative and the danger was well understood.  That is, comment i 
meant to preclude a more extravagant expansion of strict liability to 
well-understood consumer products whose “norm was danger.”  Clearly, 
both defectively manufactured products, and products that manufacturers 
promised to be safe but were not, were well outside comment i, and 
subsection (b) of the statute simply confirms that. 
The purpose of subsection (c) now also becomes clear.  It plainly 
 
 59. See, e.g., Carlin v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 1347, 1354–55 & n.7 (Cal. 1996); 
Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 304 (Cal. 1994); Anderson v. Owens-
Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 557 (Cal. 1991). 
 60. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Judges as Tort Law Un-Makers: Recent California 
Experience with “New” Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 455, 478–82 (1999). 
 61. Becker v. IRM Corp., 698 P.2d 116, 122 (Cal. 1985), overruled by Peterson v. 
Superior Court, 899 P.2d 905, 920 (Cal. 1995). 
 62. See Willie L. Brown Jr.-Bill Lockyer Civil Liability Reform Act of 1987, ch. 
1498, § 3, 1987 Cal. Stat. 5777, 5778–79 (current version at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.45  
(Deering Supp. 2000)). 
 63. See id. 
 64. See supra Part II.A. 
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states that the statute is not intended to roll back plaintiffs’ rights and 
thereby cut back on any existing liability that defendants had in 1987.65  
Rather, to repeat, the point of subsection (c) is to reemphasize that 
subsection (a) is intended to preclude the California Supreme Court from 
expanding plaintiff rights by rejecting comment i in one or both of the 
ways suggested in Barker’s footnote 10, in New Jersey’s O’Brien case, 
and in the scholarly literature.  Regardless of how one feels about it as a 
policy matter, this was a legitimate action for the California Legislature 
to take. 
Under the above interpretation, section 1714.45, as enacted in 1987, 
adopts the position that, for common personal consumption products that 
are known to be dangerous, the decision whether their risks exceed their 
benefits should be made in the market by individual consumers.  Put 
differently, jurors in an individual case should not decide that question 
for all Californians (or paternalistically for the plaintiff in that case). 
This position has considerable appeal, and it implicitly underlies 
Prosser’s thinking.  Moreover, this notion of letting the market rather 
than juries decide such matters has, in practice, swept the field in the 
years since O’Brien.  No other state took up New Jersey’s lead, and the 
New Jersey Legislature has essentially repealed the O’Brien principle.66  
Furthermore, this limited reach of products liability law is now 
essentially the position of the Restatement (Third)—albeit with a 
carefully worded and tiny escape valve that could permit a jury to 
impose strict liability on a ridiculously dangerous product with a 
“manifestly unreasonable design,”67 perhaps such as sharp, metal-tipped, 
children’s lawn darts.  And while some tobacco control advocates would 
assert that cigarettes are no better, yea, even worse, than those lawn 
darts, no court has yet taken tort law down that road in tobacco 
litigation.68  In short, rationales for expanding strict products liability 
that underlie the possibilities suggested by Barker’s footnote 10 
(however attractive) have failed to carry the day.  Yet, this subsequent 
evolution of the law was by no means certain in 1987. 
 
 65. See ch. 1498, § 3, 1987 Cal. Stat. at 5778–79. 
 66. N.J. STAT ANN. § 2A:58C-3 (West 2000). 
 67. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. e (1977). 
 68. Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., A Primer on Cigarette Litigation Under the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 27 SW. U. L. REV. 487, 506–08 (1998) 
(exploring the new Restatement (Third) section 2, comments d and e, and the removal of 
tobacco products from the list Prosser had developed for comment i to the old section 
402A). 
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IV.  LITIGATION UNDER SECTION 1714.45 
Unfortunately, the understanding of section 1714.45 presented above 
was not embraced in 1989 by the court of appeal in American Tobacco 
Co. v. Superior Court,69 and that decision led to the court of appeal’s 
decision in Naegele v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.70  The California 
Supreme Court, however, is now presented with the opportunity to adopt 
the interpretation of section 1714.45 proposed here. 
A.  American Tobacco 
Soon after the 1987 statute was passed, California courts were called 
upon to interpret it.  American Tobacco involved eleven separate 
lawsuits for personal injury and wrongful death filed by plaintiffs’ 
lawyers against several tobacco companies.71  The plaintiffs’ lawyers 
adopted a strategy as to how to interpret section 1714.45 that convinced 
the trial court judge, but which, on appeal, turned out to be too clever. 
Notice that the full text of subsection (a) of section 1714.45 provided: 
(a)  In a product liability action, a manufacturer or seller shall not be liable if: 
(1) The product is inherently unsafe and the product is known to be 
unsafe by the ordinary consumer who consumes the product with the 
ordinary knowledge common to the community; and 
(2) The product is a common consumer product intended for personal 
consumption, such as sugar, castor oil, alcohol, tobacco, and butter, as 
identified in comment i to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts.72 
The plaintiffs in American Tobacco argued that, in order to claim the 
benefit of subsection (a), the defendants had to show that they met both 
subsection (1) and subsection (2) – which is certainly a plausible, if 
technical, reading of the language given the “and” between subsections 
(1) and (2).  The plaintiffs then argued that in order for defendants to 
satisfy subsection (1) they had to admit that their product is “inherently 
unsafe,” and the plaintiffs’ lawyers rightly counted on the tobacco 
companies to refuse to do that. 
At that time, in litigation around the nation, the tobacco companies 
were still arguing that there was no proof that cigarettes caused any 
injuries, and hence it could be seen as completely inconsistent with their 
public posture, and perhaps even disastrous in future litigation, if the 
 
 69. 255 Cal. Rptr. 280 (Ct. App. 1989). 
 70. 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 666 (Ct. App. 2000) review granted, 11 P.3d 953 (Cal. 2000). 
 71. 255 Cal. Rptr. at 281. 
 72. Willie L. Brown Jr.-Bill Lockyer Civil Liability Reform Act of 1987, ch. 1498, 
§ 3, 1987 Cal. Stat. 5777, 5778–79 (current version at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.45 
(Deering Supp. 2000) (emphasis added). 
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tobacco companies were to admit, even insist, that their products were 
indeed “inherently unsafe.”73  Today, tobacco companies appear to 
concede that there is somewhat of a scientific consensus that cigarette 
smoking leads to tobacco-related disease, although the companies may 
hedge as to their own positions on the issue.74 
The court of appeal in American Tobacco rejected the plaintiffs’ 
interpretation, however.  It found the text of subsection (a) baffling and 
turned to the legislative history of section 1714.45.  Because (as 
recounted elsewhere) this section was one part of a pact reached one 
night in a well-known Sacramento restaurant, rushed through the 
legislature without committee hearings, and passed by both houses on 
the same day,75 none of the usual sorts of legislative history were 
available.  Instead, the court of appeal pointed primarily to a memo 
prepared for the Assembly Republican Caucus and a letter written by the 
president of the California Trial Lawyers’ Association (CTLA), both of 
which stated that section 1714.45 was intended to apply to tobacco 
products.76 
In effect, the court of appeal read subsection (2) as intended, not to 
provide an additional requirement, but instead merely to provide a list of 
examples of some of the products that satisfied the “inherently unsafe” 
and “known to be unsafe” requirements of subsection (1).  On that 
reading, the defendants would not have to admit that tobacco products 
are “inherently unsafe,” but rather could simply note that, for the 
purposes of strict products liability, the legislation so identified them.  In 
other words, to give effect to the legislative intent the court found in the 
memo and letter described above, it effectively read the “and” between 
subsections (1) and (2) out of the statute.77 
One can sympathize with the court of appeal’s puzzlement over the 
words of the statute.  What was the point of having a separate subsection 
(2) that seemed on its face to provide an additional requirement, when 
 
 73. Robert L. Rabin, Institutional and Historical Perspectives on Tobacco Tort 
Liability, in SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 110, 113–15 (Robert L. 
Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 1993); Gary T. Schwartz, Tobacco Liability in the 
Courts, in SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS AND CULTURE, supra, at 131, 132. 
 74. See, e.g., Chris Proctor, British American Tobacco, Smoking and Health, at 
http://www.bat.com (last visited Nov. 15, 2001); Philip Morris USA, Health Issues for 
Smokers, at http://www.philipmorrisusa.com (last visited Nov. 15, 2001). 
 75. Glastris, supra note 2, at 19. 
 76. American Tobacco Co., 255 Cal. Rptr. at 283. 
 77. A more aggressive reading of the court of appeal decision is that the court 
converted “and” into “or.” 
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subsection (2) and its reference to comment i to section 402A of the 
Restatement (Second) seemed essentially to repeat, with specified 
examples, exactly what subsection (1) was stating more generally?  To 
be sure, subsection (2) includes the phrase “intended for personal 
consumption.”78  Yet, that phrase too seems not to create an important 
limit on subsection (1).  Rather, it merely rephrases the language 
“ordinary consumer who consumes” in subsection (1).  Subsection (2) 
does contain the additional narrowing phrase “common consumer 
product”79; but again, that is just a further explication of what the 
legislature was talking about when it spoke of products that consumers 
knew to be dangerous. 
The best way to understand those hastily drafted subsections (a)(1) 
and (a)(2), as argued in Part III of this Article, is to see them as a 
package designed to embrace Prosser’s ideas as to where to draw the line 
on strict liability, as expressed in comment i, and thereby to head off 
California courts from imposing strict liability on products like 
cigarettes merely because they are “inherently unsafe” (at least when 
those dangers were well-known to those who consumed those products).  
On this score, the American Tobacco decision (and the memo and letter 
to which the opinion referred) was correct: section 1714.45(a) was 
indeed meant to apply to tobacco products, and to apply without any 
additional proof or concession by defendants on a case-by-case basis that 
their products were “inherently unsafe.”  However, the court of appeal 
stumbled when it stated the implications of this interpretation of 
subsection (a) and its compatibility with subsection (c), which flatly 
states that section 1714.45 as a whole was not meant to change 
California law, but only to declare it. 
The court of appeal jumped to the conclusion that, by rejecting 
plaintiffs’ interpretation of the interaction of subsections (a)(1) and 
(a)(2), it somehow had to find that subsection (a) as a whole gave the 
tobacco companies “immunity” from liability (discussed more below).  
The court of appeal stated that giving “immunity” to these defendants 
did change California law—since before the statute was passed, 
plaintiffs had the right to claim that cigarettes were “defective” products 
under either prong of the two-part Barker test.  Having reached that 
conclusion, the court of appeal found subsection (c)’s statement that the 
law was not being changed impossible to support.  Hence, the court of 
appeal announced that it was reading subsection (c) as not intending to 
 
 78. See Willie L. Brown Jr.-Bill Lockyer Civil Liability Reform Act of 1987, ch. 
1498, § 3, 1987 Cal. Stat. 5777, 5778–79 (current version at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.45 
(Deering Supp. 2000)). 
 79. See id. (emphasis added). 
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change California law “except as specifically provided in section 
1714.45.”80 
With all due respect, the court’s reading is a misinterpretation of 
subsection 1714.45(c).  In effect, the court of appeal read subsection (c) 
out of the statute altogether.  Every statute only changes existing law to 
the extent that it does, and so it would seem strange in the extreme to 
read subsection (c) as the court did for this statute, when, on its face, it 
so clearly says something different.  But one can see the dilemma that 
the court of appeal was in, given its sweeping take on the implications of 
subsection (a), together with its limited analysis of what California law 
was before section 1714.45 was adopted. 
What the court of appeal seemingly failed to appreciate was that under 
the Barker tests, as then developed, plaintiffs would lose their case if 
they merely claimed that cigarettes were inherently unsafe consumer 
products that users knew were unsafe.  If those were the only claims that 
subsection (a) barred, then it barred claims that, at the time, were not yet 
good claims in California.  This is precisely the point. 
To repeat, the whole purpose of the original section 1714.45 should be 
seen as preventing the California courts from changing the law and 
embracing a more sweeping rule that reflected the ideas suggested by 
Barker’s footnote 10.  This understanding of the legislative intent makes 
subsection (c) altogether coherent.  It also captures the clear gist of 
subsection (a)—as embracing comment i.  It does grant a limited 
“immunity” to manufacturers and sellers of tobacco products and the 
like, but only against claims that they should be held liable to consumers 
merely because their products are “inherently unsafe.” 
In terms of the exact language of subsection (a), my interpretation 
requires only a history-based understanding of the word “if.”  Notice 
again that subsection (a) starts, “In a product liability action, a 
manufacturer or seller shall not be liable if . . . ,” which is then followed 
by subsections (1) and (2).81  The “if” should be understood to mean 
“because” or “based on claims that” or “on the ground that,” but this “if” 
should not mean that “in no event should any such action be allowed.”  
In other words, no sweeping immunity should arise from this “if.”  
Rather, immunity should only be granted from efforts to reject comment 
i.  As the CTLA president’s letter stated, “Since the dangers cannot be 
 
 80. American Tobacco Co., 255 Cal. Rptr. at 285. 
 81. See ch. 1498, § 3, 1987 Cal. Stat. at 5778–79. 
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further reduced, minimized or alleviated without removing the product 
from the market, product liability suits would only require or cause their 
removal.  The policy decision has already been made by society in favor 
of their availability.”82  The phrase “product liability suits” in the CTLA 
letter surely referred to those seeking to deem cigarettes “defective” on 
grounds of their inherent dangers alone.  Furthermore, as discussed 
earlier, the letter concedes that it may be wiser for individuals in society 
through their market behavior to conduct the risk-benefit test, rather than 
allow a jury to decide that the risks exceed the benefits and thus imply 
(as with all other defective products) that cigarettes should no longer be 
sold. 
Clearly, the CTLA president was not saying that the adoption of 
section 1714.45 precluded all product liability suits against tobacco 
manufacturers.  For one thing, as explored above, subsection (b) itself 
expressly notes that claims for manufacturing defect and express 
warranty could still be brought.83  Contrary to claims made by the 
tobacco companies in their brief to the California Supreme Court in 
Naegele,84 there is no good reason to treat subsection (b) as exhaustive.  
The California Legislature understandably explicitly reserved victims’ 
ongoing right to sue on theories that were very familiar and clearly not 
intended to be preempted.  If subsection (a) is read as suggested here it 
only cuts out one specific theory.  All other theories are left for the 
courts to deal with outside of the statute. 
In defining the term “product liability action” as used in subsection 
(a), subsection (b) uses the phrase “any action for injury or death caused 
by a product.”85  But this definition is no roadblock to the argument 
advanced here.  The phrase simply means that no matter how a plaintiff 
phrases his or her product liability claim, if it seeks to impose liability 
where comment i would reject it, that claim is barred. 
Suppose that a tobacco company adds a new ingredient to its 
cigarettes to enhance their flavor, and suppose it turns out that many 
smokers are highly allergic to this ingredient and suffer serious harm 
from it.  Suppose further that the victims can prove that scientists inside 
the company knew of the dangerous nature of the additive and told 
managers of the risks, but, because of pressures from the marketing 
department, the additive was used anyway.  It would be astounding if the 
California Supreme Court were to conclude that section 1714.45 
 
 82. American Tobacco Co., 255 Cal. Rptr. at 283. 
 83. See ch. 1498, § 3, 1987 Cal. Stat. at 5778–79. 
 84. Respondents’ Answer Brief at 45–49, Naegele v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 
96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 666 (Ct. App. 2000) (No. S090420), 2001 WL 664446, review granted, 
11 P.3d 953 (Cal. 2000). 
 85. See ch. 1498, § 3, 1987 Cal. Stat. at 5778–79 (emphasis added). 
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precluded lawsuits against that tobacco company for injuries arising 
from the additive.  However, notice that these lawsuits could readily be 
cast as claiming a design defect (there is a safer design without that 
additive) or a warning defect (the company should have warned of the 
dangers of the additive).  Those lawsuits would not raise manufacturing 
defect or express warranty claims as covered by subsection (b).  But if 
the court of appeal’s language in American Tobacco is to be taken 
literally, then, under subsection (a), the defendants would be immune 
from such claims concerning the additive.  Surely, such a result cannot 
be right. 
Part of the problem stems from the way the court of appeal in 
American Tobacco cast the case at the outset.  It says simply that the 
plaintiffs allege that the victims “became ill, and in some cases died, 
allegedly as a result of being exposed to tobacco.”86  This statement 
gives no feel whatsoever for the precise nature of their theory of the 
case.  It is as though the plaintiffs were claiming liability solely on the 
basis of causation, which they certainly were not.  But the court of 
appeal seemed to see no need to go any further into the matter.  This 
apparently occurred because the case seems to have been understood as 
one in which the plaintiffs were conceding that their claims should be 
thrown out unless their reading of the statute was accepted (that is, that 
the defendants had to admit their products were “inherently unsafe”). 
B.  Richards v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.87 
The interpretation of section 1714.45 set forth in this Article is by no 
means precluded by the California Supreme Court’s 1997 decision in 
Richards.  Richards concerned the application of Proposition 51, adopted by 
California voters in 1986, which provides that in cases with multiple 
tortfeasors, each defendant is liable only for its share of the victim’s 
noneconomic damages (pain and suffering) in proportion to its share of 
overall responsibility or fault.88  In Richards, defendant asbestos manufacturers 
and employers sought to avoid full responsibility for the noneconomic 
losses associated with a smoker plaintiff’s asbestos-related lung injury 
by arguing that some of those damages were properly the responsibility 
 
 86. American Tobacco Co., 255 Cal. Rptr. at 281. 
 87. 928 P.2d 1181 (Cal. 1997). 
 88. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1431–1431.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 2001) (codifying 
initiative measure Proposition 51 as adopted on June 3, 1986). 
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of the tobacco companies (who were not named as defendants in the 
plaintiff’s case).89 
The California Supreme Court treated the issue before it very 
narrowly.  The asbestos defendants argued that, even if the tobacco 
companies were free from direct liability to the plaintiffs under section 
1714.45, nonetheless, the asbestos defendants should not have to 
shoulder all of the plaintiff’s noneconomic losses (seemingly on the 
ground that, absent section 1714.45, the tobacco makers would be liable 
to the plaintiffs, a highly uncertain assumption in any event).90  
However, the California Supreme Court responded to this argument by 
stating that “to the extent section 1714.45 affords tobacco suppliers 
immunity,”91 the asbestos makers may not point to those suppliers as a 
way of trying to escape from their own full liability to the plaintiff.  The 
California Supreme Court then made clear in footnote 8 of the Richards 
opinion, “[I]t is not necessary to determine the exact substantive scope of 
the immunity described by section 1714.45.”92  Indeed, in that footnote 
the Court then goes out of its way to say, “[W]e need not and do not take 
any position on the exact parameters of the immunity provided by 
section 1714.45, or on the correctness of the American Tobacco decision 
in this regard.”93 
V.  APPLYING THE SENSIBLE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION                    
1714.45 TO THE NAEGELE CASE 
Assuming the California Supreme Court were to interpret section 
1714.45 as suggested in this Article, how should the complaint in 
Naegele be handled?  Clearly, any cause of action seeking strict liability 
on the theory of Barker’s footnote 10 (that is, the inherent dangers of 
cigarettes) should be barred—at least to the extent that the original 
section 1714.45 applies to the case.94  But what of other theories 
plaintiffs in tobacco cases might be alleging? 
Suppose first that a plaintiff were to claim either that the warnings 
given by the defendants as to the dangers of smoking are legally 
insufficient, or that cigarettes can in fact be made much safer and the 
defendants have failed to do so.  In other words, suppose a plaintiff 
 
 89. 928 P.2d at 1184. 
 90. Id. at 1189–90. 
 91. Id. at 1191 (emphasis added). 
 92. Id. at 1193 n.8. 
 93. Id. 
 94. This assumes, among other things, that the California Supreme Court finds that 
the amended statute is not “retroactive” and that plaintiffs’ claims arose during the time 
original section 1714.45 was applicable—two issues on which the author expresses no 
opinion here. 
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makes legal claims based upon factual assertions that are directly 
contrary to Prosser’s understanding of the facts when he drafted 
comment i.  Prosser, as explained above, assumed cigarettes were inherently 
unsafe and that people well understood their dangers (even back in 1964 
when the Surgeon General’s first report was released).95  Yet, in 2001, it 
is at least possible to imagine plaintiffs mounting factual cases that are 
contrary to Prosser’s understanding.  For example, suppose a plaintiff 
offers to show that a filter, different from the filter that most tobacco 
companies now use, really does prevent cancer in smokers.  Or suppose 
a plaintiff concedes that people have long known that smoking is 
dangerous, but argues that young people did not realize how addictive 
smoking is, at least during, say, the 1970s and 1980s when they began to 
smoke as teenagers and before the Surgeon General’s later report on 
“nicotine addiction.”96 
Prosser would have said that if such facts were proven then the 
predicate for including tobacco products in the list of products he created 
for comment i would be undermined.  No longer would the product be 
inherently unsafe (on the “safer filter” theory) or its dangers well 
understood in the community (on the “we did not realize it was 
addictive” theory).  On such facts, tobacco products no longer illustrate 
the principle underlying comment i and should be removed from its list. 
It is admittedly a somewhat more difficult question as to how section 
1714.45 should be interpreted in the face of factual allegations of the 
sort just imagined.  The language of the statute reflects the legislature’s 
factual understanding at that time that cigarettes were inherently unsafe 
and their dangers well known.  The question might be thought of as 
whether the statute creates a conclusive presumption as to the facts, 
regardless of what the plaintiff claims the real facts to be.  But the better 
way to treat the matter is simply to interpret section 1714.45 in the 
narrow way already suggested—that it only rules out more sweeping 
strict liability claims based upon “inherent danger.”  On that approach, 
design and warning defect claims based upon the new factual allegations 
imagined here (a “safer filter” or there was a “warning failure as to 
addiction”) would not be barred by section 1714.45 (putting aside, of 
course, whether or not a plaintiff could actually prove such facts). 
To reemphasize the point, when section 1714.45 was adopted in 1987, 
 
 95. See supra Part II.A. 
 96. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF 
SMOKING: NICOTINE ADDICTION—A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (1988). 
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it was generally understood in the legal community that the basic 
warning defect and design defect claims that were then being brought 
were also losers—not because of some particular doctrinal reason, but 
rather because of factual problems.  That is, like Prosser, judges and 
juries in California and elsewhere were just not being convinced that 
cigarettes could either be made safer or that people were not fairly aware 
of their dangers.  Indeed, it was because of this very failure of plaintiffs 
to win product liability claims against tobacco companies using either of 
the Barker prongs, that made seeking footnote 10-based liability for 
cigarettes alluring.  Moreover, in this same light, it is easy to see why, 
once the footnote 10-based theory of liability was cut off by subsection 
(a) of section 1714.45, most observers at the time believed that cigarette 
tort litigation was pretty much over.97  Indeed, one might be forgiven for 
casually using the word “immunity” in this context.  Put differently, if 
plaintiffs at that time could not win on existing doctrine, and if they were 
prevented from asserting footnote 10’s wider theory of liability, then the 
campaign might well have seemed lost. 
But it turns out that the way things stood in 1987 is not the way they 
stand today.  Moreover, perhaps the most promising way for individual 
plaintiffs to proceed in 2001 is neither on the ground that cigarettes can 
be made safer (since it remains doubtful that such a claim can actually 
be sustained) nor on the ground that the tobacco companies failed to 
warn as to addiction (for reasons described below), but on the ground 
that the tobacco companies engaged in intentional wrongdoing, reckless 
misconduct, or fraud.  Ironically, this latter line of attack was clearly 
opened up as a result of a tobacco industry victory in the United States 
Supreme Court in 1992.98 
In Cipollone, the United States Supreme Court held that 1969 
Congressional amendments to the 1965 Federal Cigarette Labeling and 
Advertising Act99 preempted state tort claims based on failure to warn 
(at least claims brought with respect to warnings made, or not made, 
after 1969).100  Of course, even before Cipollone, for reasons already 
explained, plaintiffs were having great difficulty with product liability 
cases based on failure to warn.101  As a legal matter, not only would they 
have to convince jurors that the common warnings seen on billboard and 
magazine ads and on the packages themselves were too mild, but also 
 
 97. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 98. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992). 
 99. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 
(1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–41 (1994)) (amending the Federal 
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965)). 
 100. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524. 
 101. See Schwartz, supra note 73, at 149–53. 
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that a stronger warning would have actually made a difference in the 
victim’s smoking behavior—a daunting task.  But Cipollone took away 
the right even to try to make that case (at least as to post-1969 
warnings).102  Note that this decision not only preempted warning-
related complaints about the dangers of smoking (like lung cancer, heart 
disease, and so on) but also warning-related complaints about addiction 
(again, at least for post-1969 warnings).103  The essence of the United 
States Supreme Court’s opinion was that Congress had determined both 
what appropriate cigarette warnings were and that there should be a 
uniform national system of warnings which would be undercut if state 
tort law could, in effect, insist that tobacco companies provide different 
warnings. 
Nevertheless, the Cipollone Court went out of its way to make clear 
that not all possible tort claims against the tobacco companies are 
preempted by federal law.  Justice Stevens’ plurality opinion specifically 
stated that tort claims resting on theories of express warranty, fraudulent 
misrepresentation, intentional concealing of facts, conspiracy, and the 
like are not preempted.104  As a result of that decision, plaintiffs in 
tobacco cases around the nation have increasingly taken to alleging 
fraud, conspiracy, and other types of intentional or reckless 
wrongdoing—claims that have become somewhat more plausible to 
prove in the years since 1990 as secret tobacco company documents 
have come to light.105  Indeed, these are among the very claims that 
plaintiffs have alleged in Naegele.106 
In conclusion, the California Supreme Court should construe section 
1714.45 narrowly in the way argued above, and then send the Naegele 
 
 102. 505 U.S. at 524. 
 103. Id. at 530–31. 
 104. Id. at 526–31. 
 105. See generally STANTON A. GLANTZ ET AL., THE CIGARETTE PAPERS (1996); 
PHILIP J. HILTS, SMOKE SCREEN: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY COVER-UP 
(1996); DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF INTENT: A GREAT AMERICAN BATTLE WITH A 
DEADLY INDUSTRY (2001); RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES: AMERICA’S HUNDRED-
YEAR CIGARETTE WAR, THE PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE UNABASHED TRIUMPH OF PHILIP 
MORRIS (1996); MIKE A. MALES, SMOKED: WHY JOE CAMEL IS STILL SMILING (1999); 
CARRICK MOLLENKAMP ET AL., THE PEOPLE VS. BIG TOBACCO: HOW THE STATES TOOK 
ON THE CIGARETTE GIANTS (1998); MICHAEL OREY, ASSUMING THE RISK: THE 
MAVERICKS, THE LAWYERS, AND THE WHISTLE-BLOWERS WHO BEAT BIG TOBACCO 
(1999); TARA PARKER-POPE, CIGARETTES: ANATOMY OF AN INDUSTRY FROM SEED TO 
SMOKE (2001). 
 106. Naegele v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 666, 669 (Ct. App. 
2000), review granted, 11 P.3d 953 (Cal. 2000). 
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case back to the trial court to sort out the various claims that were 
alleged.  Some of those claims, including claims of fraud and related 
wrongdoing, should be allowed to go ahead—provided, of course, that 
the plaintiffs’ evidence concerning such claims is strong enough to get 
them past motions for summary judgment or directed verdict using 
normal standards. 
Whether plaintiffs, in the end, would win any of these claims is not a 
matter that concerns this Article.  But the approach recommended here 
would provide a coherent, textually sensible, and historically rooted 
interpretation of section 1714.45 as it was enacted in 1987. 
 
